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BELLUMAMERICANUM: THE U.S. VIEW OF
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WAR AND ITS
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT
Michael N. Schmitt*
For nearly as long as humans have engaged in organized violence,
there have been attempts to fashion normative architectures to con-
strain and limit it. Such architectures-labeled the law of armed
conflict in late Twentieth century parlance-are the product of a sym-
biotic relationship between law and war. At times, humans, fearful
that warfare is evolving in a negative direction, have acted proactively
through law to forestall possible deleterious consequences. Thus, for
example, many states, including the United States, have agreed to ban
the use of blinding lasers in advance of any military force fielding them.'
Much more frequently, however, law has proven reactive Indeed, in the
* Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force. Professor of Law, United States Air
Force Academy. The author is indebted to Dean Barbara Safriet of Yale Law School for the
opportunity to spend 1997/98 at Yale as a Visiting Scholar. The views, opinions, and conclu-
sions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and should not be construed as an
official position of the Department of Defense or United States Air Force.
1. See Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 35
I.L.M. 1218 [hereinafter Protocol IV]. The ban on bacteriological weapons also illustrates
the proactive approach. Despite isolated uses of the weapons in modern warfare, for the great
part their employment has been avoided. Instead, the international community has articulated
a near universal abhorrence of these weapons, twice codifying prohibitions thereon in this
century. See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or
other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65, 14 I.L.M. 49 (1975); see also Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 164, 11
I.L.M. 309 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention]. Biological warfare activities of the
Japanese during World War II are described in YuKI TANAKA, HIDDEN HORRORS: JAPANESE
WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR 11 135-65 (1996). For a fascinating account of the use of bi-
ologicals during antiquity, see Adrienne Mayor, Dirty Tricks in Ancient Warfare, Q. J. MIL.
HIST., Autumn 1997, at 32.
2. For instance, the Union Army did not adopt Professor Francis Lieber's "set of regu-
lations" (today known as the Lieber Code) regarding conduct in war, until the U.S. Civil War
motivated the Army to do so. U.S. WAR DEP'T, GENERAL ORDERS No. 100, INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (1863), reprinted in
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS 101 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
Schindler & Toman]; Richard R. Baxter, The First Modern Codification of the Law of War,
25 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 171 (1963). Likewise, it took Henri Dunant's account of the hor-
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twentieth century, codification efforts have followed major wars in
almost lock-step fashion.'
As the global community enters the next millennium, it is a propi-
tious moment to consider how this symbiosis between war and the law
of armed conflict will continue to evolve. That is the purpose of this
article. It begins by asking what warfare might look like in the twenty-
first century. This prognosis provides the foundation on which to offer
suggestions as to how law might respond to future war.
Two obstacles stand in the way of any predictive endeavor along
these lines. First, it quickly becomes apparent that there are myriad rea-
sonable alternative futures, for the universe of variables is vast. Who are
likely to be the core adversaries of the next century? How technologi-
cally advanced will these notional opponents be and what might they
target? What types of conflict will dominate the future? Will States gen-
erally fight alone or cooperatively under umbrella organizations such as
the UN, NATO, WEU or even the European Union? How will economic,
political, ethical and social forces affect weapons development and ac-
quisition?
The second obstacle is more basic than the first. Even assuming ar-
guendo that a "best" guess can be discerned among potential futures,
history, as Arthur Schlesinger has noted, teaches us that "the ability to
forsee that some things cannot be foreseen is a very necessary quality."'
Who, for example, watching the Wright brothers' Flyer in 1903 would
have predicted that air power would dominate late twentieth century
warfare or that reconnaissance would be conducted from man-made
objects circling the earth?5
rendous misery at the Battle of Solferino during the Italian War of Unification to focus inter-
national attention on the need for a humanitarian organization to address wartime suffering.
See HENRI DUNANT, SOUVENIR DE SOLFERINO (1862). The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) was created as a result.
3. These wars, for example, resulted in the following codifications: Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-05--Geneva Convention of 1906 and Hague Conventions; World War 1-1925
Gas Protocol and the Geneva Convention of 1929; World War Il-Geneva Conventions of
1949 and 1954 Cultural Property Convention; Korea, Vietnam, and the "wars of national
liberation"-Additional Protocols I and II, the Environmental Modification Convention, and
the Conventional Weapons Convention. International law even reacted to the Cold War
through treaties designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, the terrifying power of
which had been demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Each of the law of armed conflict
instruments is available at the ICRC documents website (visited May 18, 1998). See
<<http://www.icrc.orglunicc/ihl-eng.nsf/web?OpenNavigator>>. Arms control treaties are
available at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency website (visited May 18, 1998). See
<<http://www.acda.gov/treatie2.htm>>.
4. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE BITTER HERITAGE: VIETNAM AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 1941-1966, at 96 (1967).
5. On the difficulty of predictive efforts regarding technology, see Herb Brody, Great
Expectations: Why Technology Predictions Go Awry, TECH. REV., July 1991, at 39.
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Despite the fog obscuring the future, the search for its correct tra-
jectory is a necessary exercise in our efforts to affect it positively. This
article acknowledges, but defers, the uncertainty by focusing on a par-
ticular alternative future, what will be called here Bellum
Americanum-American war, the view of future war and warfare most
prevalent in U.S. military circles. Hopefully, use of the model will be
judged neither xenophobic nor ethnocentric. Rather, it was selected be-
cause its vision is, in a relative sense, developmentally mature.
Moreover, as the construct of a technologically oriented military wield-
ing significant influence over how even combined operations' are
executed, the U.S. approach will likely exhibit determinative influence
over warfare's evolution for the foreseeable future.
After describing Bellum Americanum at some length, the article
turns to the "stressors" it presents for the current law of armed conflict.
The term stressors is used to suggest that law evolves as it is stressed by
changing circumstances. Much as water seeks a constant level, law in-
evitably moves to fill normative lacunae. Correspondingly, law loses its
normative valence when it no longer serves "community"-a relative
concept-ends. Thus, law is contextual and directional. It is contextual
in the sense that it is understood and applied based upon the specific
social, economic, political, and military milieu in which it operates. It is
directional, for it is characterized by distinct vectors; its generation or
demise is rarely spontaneous or random. Cognizant of the suspect char-
acter of any predictive effort, then, this article will describe and analyze
how the context of a notional future, Bellum Americanum, might affect
law substantively and directionally. Of course, only time can validate
the approach.
THE U.S. VISION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
POLITICAL-MILITARY ENVIRONMENT 7
In the U.S. vision of the twenty-first century world, the gap between
rich and poor states-between "have" and "have nots"-will continue to
grow. This chasm will result in great part from the ability of developed
6. Joint operations are those which include forces of more than one service. Combined
operations include forces of more than one State.
7. This vision is based primarily on JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CONCEPT FOR FUTURE
JOINT OPERATIONS: EXPANDING JOINT VISION 2010, 8-9 (1997). See, e.g., U.S. SPACE
COMMAND, VISION FOR 2020 (1997) [hereinafter SPACE COMMAND VISION]. Note that the
term "vision" is employed here because it is the term used within the U.S. military when
articulating views of the future. It is predictive rather than aspirational in nature. For exam-
ple, it is not the U.S. desire to see the gap between technologically advanced and
technologically disadvantaged states grow.
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states to leverage their comparative economic and technological advan-
tages. At the same time, global economic interdependence will increase
due to specialization in production by individual countries or blocs
thereof. That interdependence may play itself out in the form of regional
trading blocs, possibly dominated by a single state. As might be ex-
pected, state-centrism will continue to weaken in the face of the growing
influence of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations,
multinational corporations, and even terrorist groups and international
criminal syndicates.
Within the developed world, increased economic well-being and
wider diffusion of advanced technology will give a greater number of
states the wherewithal to play a consequential role on the international
scene. In particular, more states will be able to invest a greater amount
in weapons acquisition. Economic and technical prowess will also allow
additional states to develop an indigenous weapons production capabil-
ity, a destabilizing trend that would likely lead to further proliferation of
high technology weapons.'
On the other side of the chasm, the lesser and undeveloped countries
will suffer from declining standards of living. Citizens of the disadvan-
taged states will be increasingly cognizant of their plight due to the
pervasiveness of mass communications. The result will be, at least in
some areas, unrest and instability as the "have-nots" are sensitized to the
gap between themselves and the "haves."
Regional conflict is expected to remain the major threat to interna-
tional peace and security,9 and there will be an increasing likelihood of
asymmetrical challenges. Stymied by the relative dominance of the U.S.
and its allies in conventional warfare, opponents, whether states or not,
will consider such unconventional means as weapons of mass destruc-
tion, information warfare, and terrorism to strike less traditional centers
of gravity. Many threats will be transnational in nature---e.g., interna-
tional drug and weapons trade; political, religious, or ethnic extremism;
environmental damage. In addition, the risk of "wild card" events (i.e.,
unanticipated occurrences that fundamentally change the international
power scheme) will always be present.
8. On the proliferation threat from both state and non-state actors, see, for example,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE (1996).
9. The National Security Strategy categorizes the threats described herein as: regional
dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational dangers, and wild cards. See THE WHITE
HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY 8-10 (1997). For an argu-
ment that future clashes are likely to be driven by culture rather than ideology or economics,
see generally, Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer
1993, at 22.
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Security specific visions of the next century are the byproduct of
these larger trends.'0 Military power will continue to be a major deter-
minant of national strength, though resort to force by developed states
will most often be in collaboration with others. Proliferation of conven-
tional weapons will be widespread, and the number of nuclear powers
will grow. Military forces will continue to be called on to conduct hu-
manitarian operations and deter the spread of regional conflict, as in the
case of Bosnia.
In the developed world, militaries will become smaller, compensat-
ing for their loss of personnel and equipment by leveraging technology
to allow them to fight asymmetrically against larger forces." Lesser de-
veloped but upwardly mobile countries, particularly those which aspire
to regional dominance, will retain large standing armies because of the
symbolism of such forces. Terrorism will be a growing factor in military
planning, particularly if terrorists acquire nuclear, chemical, or biologi-
cal weapons."
Warfare will become ever more technologically driven and depend-
ent. Advances in microtechnology, biotechnology, and information
technology will radically transform the weapons of war and the way war
is fought. So too will the growing dependence of the military on space-
based assets. As society and warfare evolve, the desired targets of war
will also shift. The goal will still be to strike decisively at an enemy's
center of gravity (or that of a target state or non-state actor in situations
short of armed conflict), but what constitutes a center of gravity in the
future may radically differ from those with which warfighters are fa-
miliar today.'3 The old paradigms of war and warfare are being broken
as we enter the next millennium.
10. These trends are described generally in JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 7, at 9-
10.
11. On leveraging the advantage in technology, see Anthony H. Cordesman, Compen-
sating for Smaller Forces: Adjusting Ways and Means through Technology, in U.S. ARMY
WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGIC CONCEPTS IN NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY SERIES 1(1992).
12. All of the likely adversaries of the United States in the Middle East are developing
chemical and/or biological warfare capabilities. See OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
17-18 (1995). Each also supports, in one form or another, terrorism. See id.
13. A wargame held recently at National Defense University illustrates the type of war-
fare the future may hold. Set in the year 2000, the scenario posits an OPEC meeting that
collapses when Saudi Arabia opposes Iranian demands for a production cutback in order to
drive prices up. After mobilizing its forces, Iran conducts several conventional attacks on
Saudi naval vessels. Hoping to destabilize the Saudi government and keep the U.S. and UK
out of the conflict, the Iranians conduct new-generation unconventional warfare. For in-
stance, a Saudi refinery is destroyed when computer malfunctions in its control mechanism
cause a fire to break out; a "logic bomb" placed in the computer system that runs trains in the
U.S. causes a passenger train to crash into a freight train; computer "worms" begin to corrupt
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THE U.S. RESPONSE
In order to deal effectively with this uncertain geopolitical environ-
ment, the United States has fashioned a National Security Strategy
labeled Engagement, the underlying premise of which is a rejection of
isolationism in favor of the post-World War II global involvement in
world affairs-illustrated by the Marshall Plan, NATO, the UN, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc.-that is viewed as
having won the Cold War.14 Because there are no well-defined adver-
saries, the military component of the strategy is capability-, not threat-
based. The goal, one that will likely continue in rough form into the
foreseeable future, is to "be able to deter and defeat nearly simultane-
ous, large-scale cross border aggression in two distant theaters in
overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies."'"
This capability to fight and win two major theater wars is complemented
by the ability to conduct "multiple, concurrent smaller-scale contin-
gency operations,"'7 such as limited strikes, no-fly zone enforcement,
sanctions monitoring, or peace-keeping/enforcement operations.
Operationally, these capabilities (and any others whose need may
surface) will be achieved through "full spectrum dominance," 8 the abil-
ity to dominate warfare whether it occurs in space, the air, on land, or at
sea and regardless of the level of hostilities. Joint Vision 2010 is the
U.S. articulation of how "full spectrum dominance" will be accom-
the U.S. military's classified deployment database; and a "sniffer" disrupts funds transfers in
the Bank of England. Steve Lohr, Ready, Aim, Zap, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996, at D1.
14. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 9, at 2.
15. See Admiral William A. Owens, The Emerging System of Systems, PROCEEDINGS,
May 1995, at 36. A threat-based strategy is designed to counter specific threats-e.g., the
Soviet threat during the Cold War. By contrast, a capability-based strategy is driven by par-
ticular capabilities-e.g., global mobility. Of course, the strategy selected drives force
structure development. For a catalogue of the capabilities seen as necessary by the U.S.
military, see JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY 24-27 (1997). A com-
prehensive study of U.S. strategic strengths and weaknesses is NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY, STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 1996 (1996). The Department of Defense completed a
major assessment of future force structure requirements in 1997. For the Secretary of De-
fense's overview of the Review, see, for example, WILLIAM S. COHEN, THE REPORT OF THE
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR) (1997). A longer term assessment than the QDR is
NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL, TRANSFORMING DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1997).
16. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 15, at 15. Today, the dual threat is generally
viewed as consisting of North Korea and Iran or Iraq. It is recognized that these may not be
the opponents of the future. However, the underlying concept, being capability-based, is that
the United States needs to be ready to respond to two major theater wars, whoever the oppo-
nents might be.
17. Id. at 16.
18. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010, at 25 (1996).
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plished in the twenty-first century. 9 Joint Vision 2010 advances opera-
tional concepts, made possible through technological innovation and
information superiority, that express how the United States will fight in
the future. Three of these concepts are particularly relevant to this article.
The first, dominant maneuver, is "the multidimensional application
of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and
employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea and space forces."2° In the
past, battlefields were generally linear-fielded forces faced each other
across a geographically distinct line. In dominant maneuver warfare the
battlefield is replaced by the battlespace, with force being applied from
a wide variety of precision platforms which are maneuvered in synchro-
nization with other platforms to defeat a target pinpointed by superior
information capabilities.2'
Precision engagement, the second operational concept, "will consist
of a system of systems that enables [U.S.] forces to locate the objective
or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired
effect, assess our level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage
with precision when required."22 The concept of precision implies more
than precise weapons; it is the ability to achieve a desired effect on a
specified objective. 3 Key to the concept is a robust surveillance and re-
connaissance capability and a collection of weapons systems that can
generate just the right degree and kind of effect. Complementing preci-
sion engagement is full dimension protection, which will employ
information technology to enhance the survivability of U.S. forces.24 It is
based on the concept that the easiest threat to deter is a known one."
Conceptually, then, warfare as envisioned in Joint Vision 2010, will
be fast-paced, mobile, and highly lethal. An array of information gath-
ering and processing assets will operate synergistically to generate
greater situational awareness of the battlespace and provide the means
necessary to surgically shape it.26 If successful, the warfighter of tomorrow
19. See id. Service specific visions complement JOINT VISION 2010. See, e.g., U.S.
NAVY, FORWARD ... FROM THE SEA (1994); U.S. ARMY, ARMY VISION 2010 (1996); U.S.
AIR FORCE, GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: A VISION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AIR FORCE
(1996).
20. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 19, at 20.
21. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 7, at 50.
22. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 19, at 21.
23. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 7, at 5 1.
24. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 19, at 23.
25. Focused logistics, the fourth operational concept is the "fusion of information, lo-
gistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift
assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations." Id. at 24.
26. The National Military Strategy cites the following "strategic enablers": 1) a high
quality force; 2) robust all-source intelligence; 3) global command and control; 4) air and sea
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will be able to operate within the enemy's decision cycle. This alterna-
tive future will cause new law to surface and highlight law which is no
longer responsive to its changed context.
THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
The question du jour among those who focus on security issues is
whether these operational concepts are made possible by a "revolution
in military affairs" (RMA).27 Revolutions in military affairs occur when-
ever the nature of war and warfare fundamentally changes."8 For
instance, Napoleon's use of the citizen soldier in the French army of the
1790s presaged war in which entire societies would be involved. A more
recent RMA occurred with the advent of nuclear weapons." In the then
existing bipolar world, off-setting nuclear arsenals led to war by proxy,
but deterred the major-power mass conflicts that had characterized inter-
state conflict during the past century-and-a-half. As in other RMAs, new
weapons and defenses (e.g., nuclear mines and artillery, intercontinental
ballistic missiles, and antiballistic missile systems) were fielded and
new operational concepts (e.g., limited nuclear options, extended deter-
rence, counterforce and countervalue targeting) were developed.
control; 5) space control; and 6) strategic mobility. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note
15, at 27-29.
27. On the "revolution in military affairs," see Dennis M. Drew, Technology and the
American Way of War: Worshipping a False Idol? AIR FORCE J. LOGISTICS, Winter 1987, at
21; James R. FitzSimonds, The Coming Military Revolution: Opportunities and Risks,
PARAMETERS, Summer 1995, at 30; Dan Gourd, Is There a Military-Technical Revolution in
America's Future?, WASH. Q., Autumn 1993, at 175; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Cavalry to
Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions, in STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING 582
(Naval War College Faculty eds., 1995); Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., Keeping Pace with the
Military-Technical Revolution, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Summer 1994, at 23; Kenneth F
McKenzie Jr., Beyond Luddites and Magicians: Examining the MTR, PARAMETERS, Summer
1995, at 15; Abhi Shelat, An Empty Revolution: MTR Expectations Fall Short, 35 HARV.
INT'L REV. 49, 52 (1994).
28. Colin Gray, e.g., cites seven "historical transformations of warfare" since the fall of
Rome: 1) fifth century cavalry, which "ushered in a long period of advantage for soldiers
who could fight on horseback"; 2) the "military revolution" of the 16th and 17th centuries
that "was led by the adoption of firearms for siege and open warfare"; 3) the "Nation in
Arms," a "concept of popular warfare, increasingly armed and sustained by industrially and
agriculturally modem states"; 5) "mechanized warfare", signaled in 1916 by use of the tank
in the Battle of the Somme and large-scale aerial battles over Verdun; 6) "nuclear warfare";
and 7) information age warfare. Colin S. Gray, The Influence of Space Power upon History,
15 COMP. STRATEGY 293, 297 (1996). See also, Eliot A. Cohen, A Revolution in Warfare,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar./ Apr. 1996, at 37.
29. For a comparison of the nuclear and information RMAs, see Martin C. Libicki, In-
formation & Nuclear RMAs Compared, NAT'L DEF. U. STRATEGIC F., No. 82, July 1996
(visited Sept. 13, 1998) <<http://www/ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforumforum82.html>>.
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When they occur, RMAs generate fundamental change in the nor-
mative architecture of war. For instance, the carnage that resulted from
the clash of mass armies during the Napoleonic era motivated much of
Hague law. Further, the sheer size of the resulting conflicts and the fact
that they now often occurred where civilians were collocated led to
greater suffering by non-combatants. Geneva law resultedl So too with
the nuclear RMA. In the very short period since nuclear weapons have
been in existence, and despite only two uses of atomic bombs, the
global community has responded with treaties,31 attempts to articulate
customary law,32 and judicial opinions.33 The causal relationship between
RMAs and law is apparent.
In the U.S. view, an RMA is well under way. The United States sees
fundamental change in three areas: information operations, weapons
systems, and space. 34 This author would add a fourth arena of change,
30. "Geneva law" is a term used to denote that portion of the law of armed conflict ad-
dressing protected persons: civilians, prisoners of war, the sick or shipwrecked, and medical
personnel. It is to be distinguished from "Hague law" which governs methods and means of
combat, occupation, and neutrality. For a discussion of the international instruments which
fall into each category, and of those which display elements of both, see FREDERIC DE
MULINEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WAR FOR ARMED FORCES 3-4 (1987).
31. See, e.g., Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, 2 I.L.M. 889; Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, 6
I.L.M. 521; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, open for signature, July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 7 I.L.M. 811; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Em-
placement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and
the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 10 I.L.M. 146.
32. See, e.g., Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear
Weapons, G.A. Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); Reso-
lution on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the
Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 2936, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30, at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/8730 (1972); Resolution on the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear
War, G.A. Res. 35/152D, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 48, at 69, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980).
33. See Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
July 8, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 809; see Michael N. Schmitt, The International Court of Justice and
the Use of Nuclear Weapons, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Spring 1998, at 91.
34. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 7, at 23-25. Some have cautioned about forget-
ting basic truisms of war in the haste to embrace new technologies as a panacea to clear the
fog of war. Mackubin Owens of the Naval War College has noted that there is a:
[r]ecredescence of a McNamara-like worship of technology in some parts of the
Pentagon, a worship that ignores the principal lesson of military history: as long as
war involves humans, no technology can completely eliminate friction, ambiguity
and uncertainty, thereby ensuring that a military organization will function at 100
percent efficiency.... The question is, who is more relevant to war in the real
world: Clausewitz, who observed that 'everything in war is simple, but the sim-
plest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of
friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war'; or those who reject
him, explicitly or implicitly, assuming that technology will render friction in war
obsolete?
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one derivative of the other three-militarization of civilians and civilian
activities. Bellum Americanum clearly envisions a leveraging of the ad-
vantages offered by this revolution.
Information Systems.35 It would appear that Alvin and Heidi
Toffler's "Third Wave" is upon us. 6 Most agree that the key to the RMA
of the twenty-first century will be information." Recognizing the im-
portance of information in warfare hardly represents a strategic
epiphany; however, in the next century these capabilities will them-
selves be a key source of national power."
But technology is only part of the equation. Any approach to war that ignores
strategy and friction and tempts us to forget that war is waged against an adversary
with an active will, is doomed to failure.
Mackubin T. Owens, Planning for Future Conflict: Strategy vs. "Fads," STRATEGIC REV.,
Summer 1996, at 5-6.
35. See generally DOMINANT BATrLEsPACE AWARENESS (Stuart Johnson & Martin Libicki
eds., 1995).
36. See generally ALVIN TOFFLER & HEIDI TOFFLER, WAR AND ANTI-WAR (1993),
ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE (1980). The Tofflers posit three waves of warfare driven
by the age in which they took place: agricultural, industrial, and information. Military objec-
tives are in great part determined by the period during which they are pursued. For instance,
in the agricultural era, land was an objective, whereas in the industrial period, industrial
capacity was. The work of the Tofflers is now de rigeur in U.S. War Colleges, though not all
are convinced of its validity. For a piece criticizing the work as neo-Marxist and charging
that the Tofflers had to "rearrange certain chronologies so the events develop in proper se-
quence," see R.L. DiNardo & Daniel J. Hughes, Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information
Warfare, AIRPOWER J., Winter 1995, at 69-70. For two fascinating discussions of the origin
of war, see, for example, BARBARA EHRENREICH, BLOOD RITES (1997) and ROBERT L.
O'CONNELL, RIDE OF THE SECOND HORSEMAN: THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF WAR (1995).
37. In anticipation of this reality, the U.S. Air Force, Army and Navy have all estab-
lished information warfare centers, as has the Central Intelligence Agency, and doctrine on
information warfare has recently been formally issued by the U.S. Joint Staff. See Mark
Walsh, U.S. Military Expands Information Warfare Defense, DEF. NEWS, Apr. 28-May 4,
1997, at 25; Lohr, supra note 13, at Dl; see, e.g., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
(CJCSI), Joint Information Warfare Policy (1994) (series, some documents classified); JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF, INFORMATION WARFARE DIVISION-J6K, INFORMATION WARFARE: LEGAL,
REGULATORY, POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASSURANCE, (1995).
38. This point is made by Joseph Nye and William Owens:
The core of these capabilities-dominant situational knowledge-is fungible and
divisible. The United States can share all or part of its knowledge with whomever
it chooses. Sharing would empower recipients to make better decisions in a less-
than-benign world, and should they decide to fight, they could achieve the same
kind of military dominance as the United States....
As its capacity to provide this kind of information increases, America will in-
creasingly be viewed as a coalition leader, not just because it happens to be the
strongest but because it can provide the most important input for good decisions
and effective action for other coalition members. Just as nuclear dominance was
the key to coalition leadership in the old era, information dominance will be the
key in the information age.
The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War
Many of the powerful information technologies are next generation
improvements on current systems.39 For example, by the early part of the
twenty-first century, satellites will offer worldwide coverage any time of
day and with astonishing spatial resolution. The future may even include
sound sensors powerful enough to allow a satellite to detect a conversa-
tion on earth.4 Advances in artificial intelligence will allow this data
and that from other sensors to be fused, organized, and disseminated
almost instantaneously.
Even more fantastic are new technologies. Consider micromachin-
ing. Scientists now believe that in the future they will be able to build
robots disguised as insects that will have both optical and communica-
tions capabilities. Such systems could be used in areas where current
systems are ineffective like jungles with thick canopies. Some scientists
believe that the sensors may one day approach the size of dust miles
and be seedable by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). More amazing
still, micromachined sensors may be able to taste and smell, useful
senses when seeking out chemical weapons or finding objects made
with a particular substance, such as the metal of military vehicles or air-
craft.42 Of course, whether new or improved, sensor technologies are no
panacea, a fact well illustrated by the futile attempt to destroy mobile
Scuds during the Gulf War.43
The ultimate benefit of information technologies is that they allow
the warfighter to "get inside" the opponent's OODA-observe, orient,
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & William A. Owens, America's Information Edge, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar./Apr. 1996, at 20, 27.
39. There are four categories of sensors: 1) far stand-off sensors such as satellites; 2)
near stand-off sensors such as aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles carrying various sensors
(multispectral, passive microwave, electronic intelligence, etc.); 3) in-place sensors, such as
acoustic, gravimetric, biochemical, and ground-based optical; and 4) weapons sensors, such
as infrared, reflected radar, etc. See MARTIN C. LIBIcKi, WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE?
22(1995).
40. Resolution is expected to reach ten meters, improvable to two-to-three meters with
signal-to-noise calculations. Periodic coverage in the submeter range will be made possible
through multispectral, hyperspectral, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) images. See Jeffrey
E. Thieret et al., Hit 'em Where it Hurts: Strategic Attack in 2025, in 3.1 AIR UNIVERSITY,
2025, WHITE PAPERS 173, 187 (1996).
41. See Pat Cooper, U.S. Develops Army of 7Iny Robots, DEFENSE NEWS, Nov. 11-17,
1996, at 4.
42. Smelling sensors would be designed to detect particular chemical molecules, which
would cause an organic change in the sensor detectable by irradiated light or X-ray energy.
Tasting sensors would attach themselves to particular substances. They too could be irradi-
ated. In both cases, overhead sensors could be used to collect the data. See Thieret, supra
note 40, at 187-88.
43. For an excellent review of future sensors and sensor operations, see Spacecast 2020:
Leveraging The Infosphere: Surveillance and Reconnaissance in 2020, AIRPOWER J., Sum-
mer 1995, at 8.
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decide, act-loop and shape the battlespace before the adversary can.
This represents a decisive advantage. Consider the individual soldier.
In the not too distant future, he or she will be equipped with the Land
Warrior Modular Fighting System. Its components will include a hel-
met-mounted computerized display tied to an improved weapon with a
thermal sensor capable of night vision and an image enhancer for ac-
curacy. The system will be capable of seeing around corners and over
barriers and all images can be digitized for transmission up the chain
of command. Soldiers of tomorrow will be able to view a real time
"picture-map" of the area they are in through eye-sized video displays.
Not unexpectedly, the soldiers will also be equipped with computers
linked to others in their unit. The net result will inevitably be to make
the soldier more lethal and able to operate more autonomously in the
heat of battle."
Similar enhancements will pervade other arenas of combat. Combat
aircraft will benefit from information gathered by sensors on sister air-
craft, as well as space and ground based sensors and uninhabited
reconnaissance aerial vehicles (URAV).4'5 This will improve targeting
precision, enhance survivability, and reduce the possibility of fratricide.
Ship-board information improvements may include the Force Threat
Evaluation and Weapon Assignment system being tested by Johns Hop-
kins University. The system will fuse data from all of a naval
battlegroup's radars to create a three-dimensional display containing
graphics, rather than symbology, of threats; it will then recommend
which should be engaged and when. 6
At the operational (theater) and strategic levels of warfare, decision-
making will be enhanced by the new information C4ISR technologies. 7
Senior commanders will be able to literally watch the battle unfold. The
transparency of one's opponents and the reliability and ease of commu-
nication with subordinate units will produce an unprecedented
operations tempo. In particular, access to on-demand real-time informa-
44. See Barbara A. Jezior, The Revolutionized Warfighter Circa 2025 (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file at Naval War College Library); Art Pine, Revolutionary High-tech Military
Plan Isn't ready for the World's Battlefields, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 5, 1997, at D5. See also
Infantry System Turns Soldier into High-Tech Urban Warrior, NAT'L DEF., Apr. 1997, at 24.
45. See, e.g., 11 U.S.A.F. SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD, NEW WORLD VISTAS: AIR AND
SPACE POWER FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995).
46. Douglas Waller, Onward Cyber Soldiers, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 38, 41.
47. U.S. approaches to these technologies, such as command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, are outlined in JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, C41 FOR THE WARRIOR: GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM-FROM
CONCEPT TO REALITY (1994).
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tion will allow real-time planning, rather than the current practice of
executing plans developed in advance of the engagement."
Lest information be considered a panacea, one must recognize the
technology that proponents of the new era herald may effectively prove
to generate little more than additional Clausewitzian fog of war. For in-
stance, microminiturization will enhance stealth (now labeled low
observable/masking technologies-LOMT), as will active radio fre-
quency and next generation passive infrared capabilities.49 Similarly, by
the removal of the pilot and cockpit-producing "uninhabited combat
aircraft vehicles" (UCAC)-aircraft can be designed to reduce radar
cross-section by a factor of two (or a factor of four for area radars).,0 A
possible obstacle to transparency may even be data overload-so much
information that human decision-makers will become over-tasked and
over-stressed, and thereby make bad decisions.5'
Finally, the availability of the systems may breed unhealthy depend-
encies-and vulnerabilities." Today the U.S. military alone has over 2.1
million computers and 10,000 local area networks. 3 Given their impor-
tance, information systems will be key targets. Indeed, during the Gulf
War, they represented the lead target set for Coalition attacks.4 To the
48. See JotNr CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 19, at 15. What these developments will do
to the fundamental nature of military decision-making has yet to be seen. Greater technology
could lead to greater restraints on the "shooter' a phenomenon exemplified in the past by
excessive radar based ground control over East-Bloc pilots conducting aerial intercepts. The
danger is that the closer the senior commander is to being on the battlefield, the more he or
she may want to control it. On the other hand, the individual shooter will have far more in-
formation available to make informed decisions than has been the case thus far. For example,
today fighters patrolling no-fly zones depend on aircraft, such as the AWACS, to provide
them with a verbal picture of their combat environment. In the Twenty-First century, that
information will be immediately available in the cockpit. Such individual capabilities could
have the effect of allowing greater autonomy to those who directly apply force. This danger
is noted in JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 7, at 27. "Access to extensive information
about the tactical situation may tempt strategic and operational commanders to take control
of tactical actions." Id.
49. U.S.A.F. SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 45, at 60; JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, supra note 7, at 25. Even today a stealth Comanche helicopter and a T-3 unmanned,
reconnaissance aerial vehicle (URAV) are under development. See To Dissolve, to Disappear,
ECONOMIST, June 10, 1995, at 11.
50. U.S.A.F. SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 45, at 8.
51. See DiNardo & Hughes, supra note 36, at 75.
52. See, e.g., James Blackwell, Prospects and Risks of Technological Dependency, in
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGIC CONCEPTS IN NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY SERIES
29 (1992); Neil Munro, The Pentagon's New Nightmare: An Electronic Pearl Harbor, WASH.
POST, July 16, 1995, at C3.
53. See Thomas E. Ricks, Information-Warfare Defense Is Urged, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6,
1997, at B2.
54. The Operation Desert Storm Air Campaign Plan is described in U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 73-75, 95-101 (1992). The approach to
current targeting philosophy has been set forth by Colonel John Warden as "Five Strategic
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extent forces become dependent on information resources, will they be
able to operate in the event of disruption?55 Will information enable the
forces of tomorrow... or cripple them?
Weapons Systems. The second change underlying the RMA is a
quantum leap in weapons systems capabilities, an exaggerated con-
tinuation of a trend that has been underway for some time. For instance,
through 1943 the U.S. Eighth Air Force attacked only fifty strategic tar-
gets in Germany. By contrast, in 1991 Coalition air assets struck 150
strategic targets on the first day of the war alone. 6 Advances on this
scale will continue into the twenty-first century, and can be grouped into
two categories: weapons systems intelligence and weapons effect.
Today's precision guided munitions (PGMs) are colloquially known
as "smart" weapons. In the next century, weapons systems will be much
more-they will be "brilliant." 5 The key to this improvement is the con-
cept of a weapon system. Twenty-first century weaponry will draw
information from a wide variety of sources (a system), not simply from
on-board sensors or the launcher, to identify a target, strike it, and report
results. To illustrate, consider an attack on a suspected biological weap-
ons facility. Because of the risk that the attack could release biologicals,
precision is essential. One Air Force study describes the type of infor-
mation that would be gathered prior to such an attack:
In the year 2025, sensor collection provides enough data for a
virtual 3-D model of the [target] to include its composition, in-
ternal structure, baseline characteristics, and tendencies....
[s]ensors determine the building's exact dimensions and floor
plan. They then highlight soft spots. Sensors distinguish be-
Rings." The concentric rings are political leadership, economic systems, supporting infra-
structure, population, and military forces. Attacking leadership targets (command and
control, communications, etc.) greatly diminishes the difficulty of attacking military forces.
Leadership is seen as the primary center of gravity. See generally John A. Warden, III, The
Enemy as a System, AIRPOWER J., Spring 1995, at 41,44.
55. For an argument that the "Network Force" must train to the possibility of disrup-
tions in the information system, see, Mark Tempestilli, The Network Force, PROCEEDINGS,
June 1996, at 42, 46.
56. See Jeffrey McKitrick et al., The Revolution in Military Affairs, in BATITLEFIELD OF
THE FUTURE 65, 78 (Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E. Grinter eds., 1995).
57. The most publicly visible change has been in weapons accuracy, a result of mis-
leading Gulf War news coverage of smart bomb (precision guided munitions-PGM) attacks.
In fact, they were prematurely acclaimed. Only roughly eight percent of the weapons
dropped during the war were precision guided. A General Accounting Office study of attacks
on twenty major targets found that at least two laser guided weapons were used against each.
At least six were dropped on twenty percent of the targets and fifteen percent of the targets
were attacked by at least eight. See Tony Capaccio, GAO Questions U.S. Air Power Impact
on Gulf War, DEF. WEEK, June 30, 1997, at 1. See also, Barton Gellman, US. Bombs Missed
70% of the ime: "Smart" Munitions far More Accurate, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1991, at Al.
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tween rooms containing biological agents, test equipment,
sleeping quarters, and even the snack bar. Target acquisition
sensors also construct a baseline, or living archive, of data
concerning routine activity and environmental conditions. Ex-
amples include the average number of people who enter and
exit each day, the number of vehicles in the parking lot, and
the level of noise generated by the facility."
Using this information, mission planners can determine when the
facility appears to be generating biologicals, where they are stored, and
when it can be struck without causing high numbers of civilian casual-
ties.59 To destroy the biologicals before they can be released into the
atmosphere, an incendiary will be used that will actually count walls
penetrated to ensure it explodes in the proper room."
Systems not only will be better capable of determining where to
strike, they will be better able to strike the exact point selected. With
global positioning, intertial navigation, and other guidance systems, in
the not too distant future accuracy will be measured in centimeters, not
meters as it is today.61 Weapons systems will also be much smaller due
to miniaturized munitions technology (MMT), thereby allowing more
weapons to be carried.62 In the future, a single UCAV carrying multiple
brilliant weapons for release far from the target may have the same ef-
fect as a flight of manned aircraft that today have to fight their way to
the release point.63
The second fundamental change in weapons will be in their effect
on targets. In this century most weapons have been designed to destroy
through penetration and explosive force. In the twenty-first century
the continuum of effect will be multi-dimensional. Explosives will
58. Thieret, supra note 40, at 185-86.
59. Technologies that will enable such analysis include hyperspectral and magnetic
resonance imaging. In the former, the electromagnetic spectrum is broken into its constituent
bands for hundreds of individual analyses. The data is then fused for a single readout. This
capability frustrates the possibility of a target avoiding detection in one spectrum (e.g., visual
or infrared). In magnetic resonance imaging, UAVs may spread particles over a building that
are sucked into it through the ventilation system. Air or space-borne sensors would then
image the particles to determine the building's internal structure. See id. at 187.
60. See William Matthews, New Bombs Penetrate, Incinerate, AIR FORCE TIMEs, Feb.
16, 1998, at 6.
61. U.S.A.F. SctENTInc ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 45, at 38.
62. See Thieret, supra note 40, at 189. For instance, today hardened targets are best at-
tacked with at least a 2000 pound guided bomb unit. Programs are underway to reduce that
to 250 pounds, smaller than the average conventional bomb in today's arsenal.
63. From a ground perspective, consider the Army's BAT, the brilliant antiarmour
submunition that will be fired by the Army Tactical Missile System. The munitions will use
acoustic and infrared sensors to identify a formation of vehicles, single one out for attack,
and destroy it. See Owens, supra note 15, at 37.
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still predominate, but be much more refined. For example, microtech-
nology will make possible microexplosives that can destroy targets with
mere grams of explosive." At the other end of the spectrum, non-lethal
(also known as "less lethal" to indicate they still have the capacity to
kill) weapons will increasingly be employed to limit collateral damage
and incidental injury during armed conflict and provide commanders
greater tactical flexibility during peace operations.65
The variety of non-lethals being considered is impressive. Acoustic
weapons can produce sound frequencies that disorient, cause pain, and
bring on nausea. Microwave weapons will be able to induce seizures or
simply bring on discomfort by raising the target's body temperature.'
There is even some discussion of the development of sleep-inducing
agents.
Non-lethals can also incapacitate weapons and equipment. Electro-
magnetic pulse weapons generate radio frequency wavelengths that
damage electrical components, but in most cases cause no direct harm to
humans." Supercaustics and liquid metal embrittlement agents will at-
tack surfaces, the former by corroding them (bridges, optical system
lenses, roads, tires, etc.), the latter by making them brittle and thereby
subject to fracture. Both could be delivered by shell or sprayed from an
aircraft.69 Microbes that eat rubber, silicon, electronics, and possibly
even oil, have also been mentioned as possibilities. 70 Seemingly more
benign are "stick-ums" and "slick-ums". The first uses polymers that
form a sticky foam capable of immobilizing humans without killing
them. A variant is a "super glue" that can be dispensed from the air to
foul weapons and equipment components. Slick-ums, by contrast, coat
surfaces with an anti-traction chemical that make them difficult to walk
or drive upon.71
64. U.S.A.F. SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 45, at 9-10.
65. Department of Defense policy on the use of non-lethal weapons is set forth at DOD
DIRECTIVE 3000.3, POLICY FOR NON-LETHAL WEAPONS (July 9, 1996). See also James W.
Cook, III et al., Nonlethal Weapons: Technologies, Legalities, and Potential Policies,
AIRPOWER J., Special Edition 1995, at 77, 78; see, e.g., James C. Duncan, A Primer on the
Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons, NAVAL L.REv. (forthcoming 1998).
66. See Douglas Pasternak, Wonder Weapons, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 7, 1997,
at 38, 45. Both acoustic and microwave weapons could be used for perimeter defense or
crowd control, and both, used to the extreme, are potentially lethal.
67. See GREG R. SCHNEIDER, NONLETHAL WEAPONS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION
MAKERS 27 (1997).
68. See id at 14.
69. See id. at 20-22.
70. See Jezoir, supra note 44, at 16; SCHNEIDER, supra note 67, at 27.
71. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 67, at 9-10. Especially useful in urban warfare because
of dependency on roads, slick-ums could also be used to disrupt resupply, provide blockage
in maneuver warfare, or temporarily disable runways.
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Finally, given the reliance of future war on information systems, it is
inevitable that weapons will be developed to attack them. Such tradi-
tional tactics as the use of jammers or missiles that home in on electrical
signatures will continue to be refined. More revolutionary will be at-
tacks on computer networks, sometimes called "hacker war." This form
of warfare includes sending computer viruses into an adversary's com-
puter system to destroy or alter data and programs. For example, logic
bombs can be introduced that sit idle in a computer system, awaiting
activation at the occurrence of a particular event or a set time. To illus-
trate, an air defense system logic bomb might be set to "explode" only
when the missile launch sequence is initiated. A Trojan horse, by con-
trast, is accepted into a system before it attacks. Other techniques for
disrupting an information system may be as simple as flooding it with
false information, or using sniffer programs to collect access codes that
allow entry into a target system. In some cases, such attacks may occur
without revealing the source, or even the fact of, the attack.
Space. The third defining aspect of the current RMA is the use of
space. In much the same way that the airplane revolutionized twentieth
century warfare by opening a third medium from, through and in which
to fight, so too will access to space revolutionize warfare in the twenty-
first. The Gulf War dramatically illustrated the value of space opera-
tions.7 By the twenty-first century, they will transform how war is
fought, the lethality that can be brought to bear against military objec-
tives, the extent of collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians
and civilian objects, and even where conflict will occur. It is the ulti-
mate high-ground, that objective that militaries have sought since the
first combat. The fact that it is a high-ground of infinite depth renders it
more valuable still.74
Given its value, control of space is an alluring prospect. The United
States Space Command Vision includes space control-the ability to
defend one's own space assets, whether from space or ground based
threats, while denying the use of space to an opponent-in its opera-
tional concepts. 7 The reasoning is clear:
[S]o important are space systems to military operations that it is
unrealistic to imagine that they will never become military
72. On the threat posed by information warfare, see OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR ACQuIsrrION & TECHNOLOGY, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION WARFARE-DEFENSE (IW-D), Nov. 1996, App. A (Threat As-
sessment).
73. Space systems used during the war are described in U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra
note 54, at 801-09.
74. On this point, see Gray, supra note 28, at 306.
75. See U.S. SPACE COMMAND, supra note 7.
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targets. Just as land dominance, sea control, and air superiority
have become critical elements of current military strategy, space
superiority is emerging as an essential element of battlefield
success and future warfare .... An increased dependence on
space capabilities may lead to increased vulnerabilities. As
space systems become lucrative military targets, there will be a
critical need to control the medium to ensure U.S. dominance
on future battlefields. Robust capabilities to ensure space
superiority must be developed-just as they have been for land,
sea, and air.7"
Should space control operations become a reality, the next logical
step is force projection from space. Not surprisingly, the USAF Scien-
tific Advisory Board is already discussing such possibilities as space
based lasers or the use of space based mirrors to direct ground based
lasers. 7 Space is clearly the next arena of warfare in the Bellum Ameri-
canum.
Militarization of Civilians and Civilian Activities. The final factor
revolutionizing warfare is a growing military dependency on civilians,
and on civilian objects and activities. This continues a trend that began
with Napoleonic style warfare and the advent of the industrial revolu-
tion. By the time of the Second World War, civilians and civilian objects
were being attacked directly, reflecting their criticality to military
forces. In the future, the relationship with civilians and civilian activities
will be closer still. As draw-downs in military forces occur in the devel-
oped world, many of the activities traditionally performed by military
personnel are being assumed by civilian contractors. For example, the
U.S. military is contracting out aircraft maintenance, facilities mainte-
nance, base security, transportation, communications, and the feeding
and housing of troops. Increasingly, it is approaching a point where
"member of the armed forces" will by synonymous with "trigger-
puller."
Moreover, as emphasis shifts to information operations, equipment
becomes less identifiable as military in character. The push to purchase
76. Id. The Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board concurs: "Capabilities to defend our
own space based resources and to disrupt, degrade, deny or destroy that of an enemy will be
needed sooner or later in the Twenty-First century:' U.S.A.F. ScIENTIFIc ADVISORY BOARD,
supra note 45, at 61.
77. See Id., at 47. The Board has further noted that "[t]he future Force will, eventually,
contain space, ground, and airborne weapons that can project photon energy, kinetic energy,
and information against space and ground assets. Many space and information weapons will
destroy. Others will confuse the enemy and weave the 'bodyguard of lies' that will protect
our forces.' Id. at 11 (citing Winston Churchill, said to Josef Stalin; Teheran; November,
1943).
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"off-the-shelf' products in order to lower acquisition costs means that
ascertaining character can only be reliably performed once an item is
put into use. Indeed, the bulk of information operations hardware and
software consists of commercial products adapted to military use. As
former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William
Owens has noted,
Today, the center of technological acceleration in each of these
technologies [battlespace awareness, C4I, and precision use of
force] lies generally in the commercial, non-defense sectors.
Our ability to accelerate the fielding of systems, on which we
will base our future military superiority, thus depends on our
capacity to tap into developments taking place for the most part
outside the existing Department of Defense laboratory and de-
velopment infrastructure.
78
Compounding the difficulty of distinguishing civilian from military
is the fact that to keep costs low, many facilities-ranging from office
buildings to airports-are shared by military and civilian operations.
Such sharing is particularly likely with space based assets, because of
the cost of putting them in orbit. Thus, Space Command is actively
seeking partnerships with commercial entities and consortiums, some-
times multinational in character, as well as civilian agencies (e.g.,
NASA) involved in space operations. It also seeks partnerships with for-
eign and international space operators such as the European Space
Agency.
79
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF BELLUM AMERICANUM
As noted at the outset, the context in which law operates determines
its content. Changing contexts stress existing normative architectures,
causing new law to emerge or outdated and irrelevant law to fade away.
The remainder of this article will shift from the predictive to the specu-
lative by suggesting certain stressors found in Bellum Americanum and
78. Owens, supra note 15, at 38.
79. Global Partnership is one of Space command's four operational concepts. See gen-
erally U.S. SPACE COMMAND, supra note 7. This adds another dimension to the complexity-
nationality. For example, consider neutrality. What if a belligerent was receiving dual data
(e.g., weather) from a satellite owned by a neutral or a multinational corporation with neutral
partners? Could it be attacked? Can the U.S. use data received from a satellite that it shares
with a neutral? Such complexity will only be exacerbated in the next century as space com-
mercialization explodes.
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their possible effects on the current law of armed conflict.'a The cata-
logue is neither exhaustive, nor definitive, but merely the reflections of
one writer on the possible implications of one alternative future. Moreo-
ver, the analysis is not an effort to suggest lex ferenda. The goal is to
posit probable normative vectors rather than offer aspirational visions of
the twenty-first century.
Jus ad Bellum. Bellum Americanum will stress the current jus ad bel-
lum in a number of significant ways. Most fundamentally, the concept of
war and peace-of the difference between an act that is merely unfriendly
and one that is wrongful as a threat or use of force under Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter 81-will be strained. In particular, because in-
formation operations "attack" an adversary without actually employing
force in the kinetic sense, they will raise serious questions about what
constitutes "force." 8' Should the term include state-sponsored or con-
ducted hacker attacks on a country's banks, communications networks, or
stock exchange? Does it make a difference if the operations are conducted
to "prepare the battlefield" in anticipation of an actual conflict by, for in-
stance, destroying military deployment plans and reserve force records,
corrupting intelligence systems, or sending satellites off-course? Similar
stressors exist vis-A-vis the Article 39 threats to the peace, breaches of
peace, or acts of aggression that empower the Security Council to author-
ize Chapter VII responses.s3 Moreover, the information era will challenge
80. For superb summaries of the current law of armed conflict, see, for example, L. C.
GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1993), and THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) [hereinafter Fleck]. The
latter work reproduces the Bundesehr or German Law of War Manual, Joint Services Regu-
lations (Zdv) 15/2, (Aug. 1992), and provides extended commentary thereon by international
law experts.
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'
Id.
82. It would appear that the drafters of the Charter did not intend the term "force" to
apply beyond armed force. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 106, 112 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994).
83. Under Article 39 of Chapter VII, the Security Council determines whether a "threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" exists. When the Council finds one
does, it may "call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it
deems necessary or desirable." U.N. CHARTER art. 40. It may also directly impose "measures
not involving the use of armed force," such as interrupting aerial "means of communication."
Id., art. 41. When the Security Council determines that non-forceful measures would be or
have proved inadequate, it may authorize the United Nations, regional organizations, or
member States to use force under Article 42 to restore or maintain peace. Force includes
"such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security... [including] ... demonstrations, blockade, and other operations
by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." Id., art. 42. For a discussion of
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the concept of self-defense under Article 51 and under the inherent right
to self-defense found in customary international law. Under what circum-
stances might a state be justified in responding forcefully to an
information attack? Might such an attack constitute an "armed attack"
under Article 51?' When may a state use information operations in an-
ticipation of an armed attack? 5Arguably, such stressors might move the jus ad bellum in the direc-
tion of a consequences-, not an act-based regime. In the current
normative scheme, the consequences of an act are often less important
than its nature. For instance, a devastating economic embargo is not a
"use of force" nor an "armed attack" justifying forcible self-defense,
the terms "threat, breach, and aggression" see Jochen Frowein, Article 39, in Simma, supra
note 82, at 605, 608-12.
84.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
For a discussion of "armed attack," see Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in Simma, su-
pra note 82, at 661, 668-74. Numerous international agreements and pronouncements have
reaffirmed this right of self-defense since ratification of the UN Charter. See, e.g., Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21
U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio Treaty]; Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), 9 I.L.M.
1292 (1970); North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243;
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, May 14, 1955, art. 4, 219
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Warsaw Pact Treaty].
85. Anticipatory self-defense is self-defense which occurs immediately prior to the at-
tack. The most widely accepted standard is that articulated by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel
Webster with regard to the Caroline incident. The Caroline incident involved a Canadian
insurrection in 1837. After being defeated, the insurgents retreated into the United States
where they recruited and planned further operations. The Caroline was being used by the
rebels. British troops crossed the border and destroyed the vessel by setting her afire and
sending her over Niagara Falls. Britain justified the action on the grounds that the United
States was not enforcing its laws along the frontier and that the action was a legitimate exer-
cise of self-defense. Webster replied that self-defense was to "be confined to cases in which
the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation." Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton on Aug. 6,
1842, reprinted in 2 JOHN BASSETr MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 217
(1906). Professor Yoram Dinstein adopts the terminology "interceptive" self-defense. It oc-
curs after the other side has "committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable
way." He argues that interceptive self-defense is consistent with Article 51. See YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF DEFENSE 190 (2d ed. 1994).
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even though the embargo may result in enormous suffering. 6 On the
other hand, a relatively minor, armed incursion across a border is both a
use of force and an armed attack. 7 This contrary result derives from the
law's use of "acts" as cognitive short-hand for what really matters-
consequences. Acts are more easily expressed (to "use force" versus to
cause a certain quantum and quality of harm) and more easily discerned
than an effects-based standard, on the harm suffered. This cognitive
short-hand does not work well in the age of information operations be-
cause information attacks, albeit potentially disastrous, may be physically
imperceptible. Thus, as the nature of an hostile act becomes less deter-
minative of its consequences, current notions of "lawful" coercive
behavior by states, and the appropriate responses thereto, are likely to
evolve accordingly.
Even beyond information warfare, the reality of military operations
in the next century will stress existing understandings of the line be-
tween a premature use of "defensive" force and valid self-defense. In
tomorrow's high-tech battle the first shot may be the last. As weapons
become more lethal, the incentive to strike first grows8 and the thresh-
old for preemption in self-defense on the basis of apparent hostile intent
drops precipitously."
86. On economic sanctions, see Paul Szasz, The Law of Economic Sanctions, in THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 455 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie
C. Green eds., 1998) [hereinafter Schmitt & Green].
87.
There appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be
treated as constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be considered to be
agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by
regular armed forces across an international border, but also "the sending by or on
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as it amount to" (inter
alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, "or its substantial in-
volvement therein."
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 103 (June 27).
88. On this point, see generally, Donald C.F. Daniel, The Evolution of Naval Power to
the Year 2010, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Summer 1995, at 62.
89. In order to act in self-defense, U.S. forces must face either a hostile act or a demon-
stration of hostile intent by an opponent. Hostile intent is defined as:
[T]he threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit, or organi-
zation against the United States and US national interests, US forces, and in
certain circumstances, US citizens, their property, US commercial assets, or other
designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their property. When hostile in-
tent is present, the right exists to use proportional force, including armed force, in
self-defense by all necessary means available to deter or neutralize the potential
attacker or, if necessary, to destroy the threat. A determination that hostile intent
exists and requires the use of proportional force in self-defense must be based on
convincing evidence that an attack is imminent.
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Bellum Americanum may also call into question jus in bellum par-
ticipatory notions. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the rise of
the nation-state, war has been the province and, until the turn of this
century, the prerogative of states. When non-state actors have partici-
pated in organized violence, the normative paradigm has been that of
international and domestic criminal law, not the law of armed conflict.
Even the involvement of international organizations is a relatively new
phenomenon.
Yet if the U.S. vision is accurate, in the next century military forces
will increasingly face non-state actors, ranging from terrorists to drug
cartels. As that occurs, there will be growing pressure to articulate
neoteric legal justifications for forceful responses. Consider Operation
El Dorado Canyon, the 1986 strike on targets in Libya in response to
Libyan supported terrorist attacks against Americans in Europe, in-
cluding the La Belle Disco bombing in Berlin. Though justified in terms
of self-defense, it is difficult to articulate the instant and overwhelming'
need to resort to force once those bombings had taken place. 9' Or con-
sider a hypothetical well-guarded drug laboratory in a remote region.
Under current international law there is no legal basis for bombing the
facility if more traditional law enforcement techniques fail. Or even
consider a terrorist group that acquires biological weapons but is shel-
tered by a rogue state. Again, under present law there are no grounds for
attacking the group until the point when it is actually employing (or
immediately about to employ) the weapons. If twenty-first century na-
tional security threats are to come from non-state actors, then the law
governing the resort to force is bound to evolve in a way that permits an
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION (CJCSI) 3121.02, STANDING RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT FOR UNITED STATES FORCES, at GL-9 (1994). This is a classified document,
but large portions, including this quote, are unclassified.
90. "Instant and overwhelming" is the Caroline standard. MOORE, supra note 85, at
412.
91. Actually, the Administration's statements seemed to include justifications based on
both anticipatory self-defense and retaliation. For example, in the President's national ad-
dress on the subject, he initially appeared to use reprisal as the basis for the attack: "Several
weeks ago in New Orleans, I warned Colonel Qadhafi we would hold his regime accountable
for any new terrorist attacks launched against American citizens. More recently, I made it
clear we would respond as soon as we determined conclusively who was responsible... "' He
then offered a classic self-defense justification: "Self-defense is not only our right, it is our
duty. It is the purpose behind the mission undertaken tonight-a mission fully consistent
with Article 51 of the UN Charter." President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation (Apr.
14, 1986), in DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1986, at 1-2. See also, White House Statement, in
DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1986, at 1. Much attention has been paid to the fact that the U.S. be-
lieved Libya was planning attacks on up to thirty U.S. diplomatic facilities worldwide. See
Joint News Conference by Secretary Schultz and Secretary Weinberger, (Apr. 14, 1986), in
DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1986, at 3.
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effective defense against them; this will necessitate either blurring the
state-non-state actor distinction or sharpening it by a new body of law
governing actions against non-state actors.
The Jus in Bello Generally. In terms of the jus in bello, the differen-
tiation between international and non-international conflict will
continue to be strained. 92 Bellum Americanum sees more Bosnias on the
horizon as ethnic and religious tensions remain divisive. The applicative
difficulties posed by the conceptually "neat" distinction between inter-
national and non-international armed conflicts-Additional Protocol I
vs. II and common Articles 3 of the Geneva Conventions vs. the Con-
ventions in their entirety9'-have been well illustrated in the seemingly
92. The distinction between international and non-international armed conflict is not
always clear. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, an agreement designed to
govern the latter, describes non-international armed conflict as "armed conflicts ... which
take place in the territory of a (party to the Convention) between its armed forces and dissi-
dent armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations... :' Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, art. 1, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex 11 (1977), 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977),
[hereinafter Protocol II]. International armed conflict is that which arises between states (or
other subjects of international law). See, e.g., Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions: "[T]he
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of
war is not recognized by one of them." Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I; Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Con-
vention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; and Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. Additional
Protocol 1, which supplements the Geneva Conventions with regard to international armed
conflict, simply refers back to Common Article 2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 1, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex 1, 16 I.L.M. 1391
(1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]. In a somewhat controversial provision, Protocol I includes as
international armed conflicts "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination." Id. art. 1, para. 4. Note that "internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature" are not armed
conflict, either international or non-international. Protocol II, supra, art. I para. 2.
93. Article 3 of each of the Geneva Conventions is identical and provides basic protec-
tions for "[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause." Geneva Convention I, supra note 92, art. 3; Geneva Conven-
tion II supra note 92, art. 3. Geneva Convention III, supra note 92, art. 3. Geneva Convention
IV, supra note 92, art. 3. The remainder of those conventions address international armed
conflicts.
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contradictory conclusions regarding conflict status issued by the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." The difficulty of
fitting future conflicts into what William Fenrick has labeled the "two
box" approach will create pressures to dissolve the distinction.' Resis-
tance to this pressure will come, of course, from those states who
jealously guard their autonomy. Thus, the natural tension between hu-
manitarian concerns and sovereignty, a tension evidenced in such issues
as humanitarian intervention, will exacerbate as attempts are made to
determine which law applies to which twenty-first century conflicts.Discrimination. Discrimination is a general principle of the law of
armed conflict that requires an attacker to distinguish between civilians
and civilian objects on the one hand and military objectives (combatants
or objects) on the other, and to use weapons capable of discrimination
between them.96 Paradoxically, despite vast improvement in weapons
systems accuracy and battlespace transparency, complying with the
principle may become increasingly difficult.97 The problem is that the
lines between lawful targets and protected objects will blur due to the
growing dependency on civilians and civilian activities during military
operations.
The Additional Protocol I approach to ascertaining military objec-
tives is relatively restrictive. Before an object may be deemed a
legitimate target, it must "make an effective contribution to military
action" or offer the other side a "definite military advantage."" Ob-
jects which make an effective contribution are those that are by nature
94. Compare Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdomovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, Oct. 7, 1997 (finding an international conflict vis-h-vis the Bosnian Croats) with
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, May 7, 1997. For a
discussion of these cases, see Leslie C. Green, Erdemovic-Tadic-Dokmanovic: Jurisdiction
and Early Practice of the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal in LESLIE C. GREEN, FURTHER
ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR (forthcoming, 1998).
95. See William J. Fenrick, The Development of the Law of Armed Conflict Through the
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in Schmitt &
Green, supra note 86, at 77-78.
96. See Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 48: "In order to ensure respect for and protection
of the civilian population and between civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objec-
tives:' Id.
97. See Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 48.
98. Id., art. 52, para 2. The term "object" includes combatants within its scope. IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977' TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST, 1949 at 635
(Yves Sandoz, et al, eds., 1987). Military advantage should be evaluated in terms of the en-
tire campaign/war and not simply in terms of the advantage which accrues directly to the
attacking force. On this point, see Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in Fleck,
supra note 80, at 105.
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beneficial to the military effort: weapons, aircraft, communications, etc.
Definite military advantage refers to objects which contribute by virtue
of their location, such as bridges and buildings used for shelter. Such
objects may not be attacked if only a "potential or indeterminate" ad-
vantage is anticipated. 9 Civilians may not be attacked m unless taking
"direct part in the hostilities."' 1 The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) commentary to the Protocol defines "direct" as "acts of
war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to
the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces."'0' When doubt
exists, a presumption of civilian status attaches. 03
The degree of nexus between the object or individual to be attacked
and military operations is already the subject of considerable debate., °4
The United States generally opposes an interpretation as restrictive as
that propounded by the ICRC.' 5 For instance, the U.S. Army has issued
a legal opinion that mission essential civilians working at U.S. bases
during an armed conflict would be appropriate targets of attack by the
enemy. '°6 Moreover, the most recent of the U.S. military manuals, The
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations states that
"[e]conomic targets that indirectly but effectively support and sustain the
enemy's war-fighting capability may . . . be attacked."' ' While this is
not the place to resolve the debate, it is clear that a further blurring of
99. See INTERNATIONAL COMMrrrEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 98, at 635-36.
100. See Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 51, para. 2.
101. See id., art. 51, para. 3.
102. INTERNATIONAL COMMrITEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 98, at 619.
103. See Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 50, para. 1-2.
104. For an argument directly opposing the ICRC's restrictive approach, see W. Hays
Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 113-45 (1990).
105. For a general unofficial compilation of the U.S. views on Protocol I by then State
Department attorneys, see Abraham D. Soafer, AGORA: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
784 (1988); Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 419 (1987).
106. Letter from DAJA-IA to Counselor for Defense Research and Engineering
(Economics), Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany (Jan. 22, 1988), cited in Parks,
supra note 104, at 134 n. 400.
107. U.S. DEP'T. OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS § 8.1.1 (1995). The manual labels this a "statement of customary law. "
Id. citing Letter from J. Fred Burzhardt, General Counsel, Dep't of Defense, to Senator Ed-
ward Kennedy, Chairman of Sub-Comm. on Refugees of Comm. on the Judiciary, reprinted
in Arthur W. Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 67 AM. J. INT'LL. 118, 122 (1973). The annotated version of NWP 1-14M specifically
defers on the more controversial issue of "[w]hether this rule permits attacks on war-
sustaining cargo carried in neutral bottoms at sea, such as by Iraq on the [Iranian] tankers
carrying oil exported by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.. U.S. DEP'T. OF THE NAVY, supra,
at 8-3, n.ll (1997).
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the lines can only increase pressures to render the standard less restric-
tive. By what logic, for example, would a civil engineer responsible for
rapid runway repair at Base X be immune from direct attack, when his
military counterpart at Base Y would not be? An analogous dilemma is
presented by objects. By current standards a munitions factory is a valid
target. Given the essentiality of computers in twenty-first century war-
fare, would a Microsoft factory not also offer an information dependent
military definite enough advantage such that it could be included on the
Air Tasking Order? Might the internet itself be a lawful target?
The operational principle of dominant maneuver set forth in Joint
Vision 2010 is a further potential stressor for the principle of distinction.
As the battle becomes virtual and non-linear, as battlefields are trans-
formed into battlespaces, military objectives and civilians and civilian
objects will be increasingly intermingled. This diminishes the de facto
protection formerly provided by distance from the forward edge of the
battle area. While it is true that the fast-paced maneuver warfare of, for
example, the German blitzkrieg made it difficult to achieve this protec-
tion, the difference with prior warfare was quantitative, not qualitative-
civilians could still flee the onslaught. Dominant maneuver generates
qualitative evolution, because, at least in belligerent territory, there are
far fewer, maybe no, places to which to flee. Similarly, in the past stra-
tegic bombing could be avoided by moving from the vicinity of strategic
targets. In the twenty-first century, by contrast, both the tactical and
strategic fight may occupy the same space. Thus, civilians might move
away from strategic targets (factories, storage facilities, etc.) only to
find themselves in the midst of battle proper.'O
This reality is likely to encourage enhanced obligations for precaution
in attack, particularly target verification.' ° The information environment
and existence of brilliant weaponry will ease compliance should this oc-
cur. One potential downside of the greater transparency of targets may
well be to encourage placement of military personnel and equipment
near protected objects or persons in the hope that the other side will
hesitate to attack lest harm befall them. The use by Saddam Hussein of
civilians and cultural sites as shields is well known.1 Indeed, since the
108. Parties to Protocol I are obligated to "endeavour to remove the civilian population,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military ob-
jectives." Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 58, para. a. However, even if a Party intentionally
uses civilians as a shield, the attacker remains obligated to consider collateral damage and
incidental injuries in their discrimination and proportionality calculations. See Id., art. 51.,
paras. 7-8.
109. The requirements for precautions are set forth in Protocol I, supra note 91, art. 57.
110. After attacking Kuwait, the Iraqis used Western and Kuwaiti hostages to shield
their military sites from Coalition air attacks. The non-Kuwaiti civilians were eventually
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conflict ended, Iraqi civilians have flooded potential targets on numer-
ous occasions to protect them in the face of threatened air attacks
against which the Iraqi military would likely prove impotent."' In much
the same way that Iraqi use of these tactics should not be particularly
surprising given their weakness vis-h-vis their opponents, the risk of
such tactics in the notional asymmetrical battles of Bellum Americanum
is especially high.
Perhaps an even more ominous prospect is that transparency may
create incentives for perfidious acts by potential targets."' If I cannot
hide, then perhaps my only means of survival is to appear to the enemy
as other than what I am. In fact, the relaxation of the criteria for com-
batant status in the past decades is historical precedent supporting the
likelihood of such a tendency. Recall that under the Regulations annexed
to Hague Convention IV, combatants were those who were members of
the regular armed forces (or formal militia), were commanded by a per-
son responsible for their conduct, wore a fixed distinctive emblem (or
uniform), carried their weapons openly, and conducted operations in
accordance with the law of war."' The 1949 Geneva Convention on
Prisoners of War extended this status to members of an organized resis-
tance movement which otherwise complied with the Hague IV
requirements.' This change was one of status, not acts. Thus, for exam-
ple, Josip Broz Tito's guerrillas would have fallen within the definition.
As the nature of warfare evolved in the post-War period from state
on state to wars of national liberation and the like, many of the forces
involved dispensed with distinguishing themselves and carrying weap-
released in December 1990 when the tactic resulted in near universal condemnation. See
CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, supra note 54, at 607-08. Using a civilian or other
protected person is a violation of Geneva Convention IV and Protocol I and constitutes a
Grave Breach. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 92, arts. 29 & 147; Protocol I, supra note
92, arts. 75 para. 2(c) & 85 para. 2. Other examples included the dispersal of helicopters to
residential areas, placing surface-to-air missiles in a school in a populated area of Kuwait
City, and placement of fighter aircraft next to the Temple of Ur. See CONDUCT OF THE
PERSIAN GULF WAR, supra note 54, at 613-15.
111. Even if a party intentionally uses civilians as a shield, a specific violation of Pro-
tocol I, the attacking party remains obligated to consider collateral damage and incidental
injuries in their discrimination and proportionality calculations. See Protocol I, supra note
92, art. 51, paras. 7-8.
112. Perfidy consists of "[aicts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to
believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of interna-
tional law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence" Protocol I,
supra note 92, art. 37. In addition to Protocol I, perfidy is forbidden in the Hague IV An-
nexed Regulations. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 23, para. F, Annex, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention
IV].
113. Hague Convention IV, supra note 112, art. 1.
114. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 92, art. 4 para. A(2).
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ons openly. The reason was quite practical. Facing a militarily superior
force which occupied much of the territory in which they were operat-
ing, guerrilla fighters could not possibly distinguish themselves and
have any chance of success." 5 This fact was recognized in Additional
Protocol I's Article 44 exception to the aforementioned criteria for
situations where "owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed com-
batant cannot so distinguish himself.",16 In such cases, a combatant need
only carry his arms openly "during each military engagement" and
"during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged
in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack ....
Law responded to practicalities that rendered compliance difficult or
dangerous for particular participants in the conflict.
The pervasiveness of surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in
next generation warfare can only serve to exacerbate this trend as the
disincentives for distinguishing themselves swell for many combatants.
In light of the technology that will be available, even revealing them-
selves briefly during or immediately preceding an attack will prove
risky. How states react to this reality will be driven by their perspective
on the humanitarian issues presented. But just as it is not surprising that
those states who might be expected to face guerrillas tended to oppose
Article 44 while those that either had arisen from guerrilla movements
or were unlikely ever to face one did not, states which enjoy a techno-
logical advantage can be expected to resist further erosion of the
standard. Those which are technologically disadvantaged may not.
A final aspect of the Bellum Americanum that may prove a stressor
for discrimination is the use of "non-lethal" weapons. Non-lethals,
while less deadly, tend to be less discriminatory. A slick-um will render
115. The requirement that combatants distinguish themselves from non-combatants
through use of a distinctive emblem dates back to the Brussels Declaration of 1874. See
Project on an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, reprinted
in Schindler & Toman, supra note 2, at 25. With regard to Protocol I, according to the Rap-
porteur, the "exception recognized that situations could occur in occupied territory and in
wars of national liberation in which a guerrilla fighter could not distinguish himself through-
out his military operations and still retain any chance of success." XV OFFICIAL RECORDS OF
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, CDDH/407/Rev.1, 453
para. 19 (1974-77).
116. Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 44, para. 3.
117. Id. The United States opposes this provision on the ground that it will place civil-
ians at greater risk by making it harder for military personnel to distinguish them from lawful
combatants. See U.S. AIR FORCE, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, OPERATIONS
LAW DEPLOYMENT DESKBOOK (1993), tab 12, para. 1.7.6.1. Thus, by the U.S. view, those
who fail to comply with the requirements of Hague become illegal combatants who can be
targeted and, if determined to be illegal combatants by an appropriate Tribunal, tried and
punished. See U.S. DEP'T. OF THE NAVY, supra note 107, § 12.7.1.
1079Summer 19981
Michigan Journal of International Law
a road treacherous regardless of who passes down it and an acoustic de-
vice is as likely to make a child playing nearby sick as it is to keep
potential attackers away from a perimeter. Interestingly, the use of non-
lethals derives from a desire to foster proportionality in warfare-less
precise weapons are employed in lieu of less lethal ones. Accordingly,
there will be significant support for relaxing the demands of discrimina-
tion when it conflicts with efforts to enhance proportionality by limiting
the quantum of collateral damage and incidental injury.
Proportionality. Proportionality is the general principle in the law of
armed conflict that prohibits means and methods of warfare which cause
collateral damage to civilian objects or incidental injury to civilians dis-
proportionate to the military advantage sought. 18 The Joint Vision 2010
operational concept of precision engagement enabled by information
systems and brilliant weaponry is likely to push traditional proportion-
ality calculations towards a point where immediately foreseeable
collateral damage or incidental injury is unacceptable, at least when
caused by a technologically advanced military." 9 In the twenty-first
century, the mere possibility of such damage may cause mission plan-
ners, or even individual soldiers, to shift to different weapons or tactics.
Collateral damage and incidental injury have historically been the
product of three factors: 1) a lack of full knowledge as to what is being
hit; 2) the inability to surgically craft the amount of force being applied
to the target; and 3) the inability to ensure that the weapon strikes pre-
cisely the right point. With regard to the first, consider the Al -
'Amariyah Bunker incident.2 Some 300 noncombatants were killed
during the Persian Gulf War when U.S. aircraft destroyed an Iraqi com-
mand and control bunker unaware that civilians had entered it during the
night. As to weapons availability and capability, extended gaps along
the continuum of force remain. For instance, because non-lethals are
absent from the inventory of most militaries, forces sent into a crowd
control or perimeter defense situation have nothing to resort to between
118. Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 51, para. 5(b) defines it as "an attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian ob-
jects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated." A similar prohibition is found in the Article 57 re-
quirements for precautions in attack. Id., art. 57, para. 2(a)(iii) & art. 57, para. (2)(b). On
proportionality generally, see William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I
in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91 (1982); Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and
Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391 (1993).
119. The targeting policy of the Coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War was
clearly moving in this direction. For instance, only PGMs were used against targets in
downtown Baghdad to avoid collateral damage and incidental injury. See CONDUCT OF THE
PERSIAN GULF WAR, supra note 54, at 97-98.
120. See id. at 615.
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warnings or warning shots and the use of deadly force. Finally, in terms
of accuracy-and despite the morbidly spectacular film of PGM strikes
during the Persian Gulf War-the reality is that many weapons continue
to lack fully reliable precision guidance. Today, for instance, fighter-
bombers still "toss," "drop," or "dive bomb" the majority of their weap-
ons, which in most cases are unguided general purpose bombs.'
Each of these obstacles will eventually be overcome by technology.
"Shooters" will be able to know what is they are hitting, and hit it with a
weapon that applies only the amount of force necessary to destroy or
disable it. Accuracy will be at nearly 100%. The question will no longer
be whether the commander, planner, or shooter properly weighed ex-
pected collateral damage and incidental injury against the concrete and
direct military advantage he anticipated.' After all, properly planned
and executed, the attack should theoretically have minimal collateral
damage or incidental injury.
But civilian casualties will inevitably occur and civilian objects will
be damaged and destroyed-even in the twenty-first century. The
evaluation of such results will turn on the exercise of "due care" in
analyzing the target and selecting the weapon and tactic to use. Of
course, this standard is operative today in Article 57 of Additional Pro-
tocol I and in customary international law.'23 The difference in the future
will be the complexity of the process given the greater availability of
target information, wider selection of weapons, and the discrimination
difficulties noted above. Al -'Amariyah Bunker provides a prototype
example of the concerns that will surround collateral damage and inci-
dental injury. The weapon selected, the GBU-28, was a 5,000 pound
121. For a description of current aerial weaponry and their employment techniques, see,
for example, Robert A. Coe & Michael N. Schmitt, Fighter Ops for Shoe Clerks, 42 A.FL.
REv. 49 (1997).
122. See Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 51 para. 5(b), and, art. 57 para. 2(b).
123. For instance, Article 57 requires "those who plan or decide upon an attack" to "do
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civil-
ian objects and are not subject to special protection" and to "take all feasible precautions in
the choices of means and methods of attack." Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 57 para. 2(i-ii)
(emphasis added). The ICRC Commentary imposes a fairly demanding standard:
[Tihe identification of the objective, particularly when it is located at a great dis-
tance, should be carried out with great care. Admittedly, those who plan or decide
upon such an attack will base their decision on information given them, and they
cannot be expected to have personal knowledge of the objective to be attacked and
of its exact nature. However, this does not detract from their responsibility, and in
case of doubt, even if there is only a slight doubt, they must call for additional in-
formation and if need be give orders for further reconnaissance .... The evaluation
of the information obtained must include a serious check of its accuracy."
INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 98, at 680-81 (emphasis
added).
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laser guided bomb that has the ability to penetrate twenty feet of con-
crete before exploding. It was just the right weapon to use because
though it would destroy the bunker, laser guidance and the fact that the
thick walls of the bunker would contain the blast meant that collateral
damage and incidental injury were unlikely. The question, therefore,
was not whether the ensuing deaths outweighed the military advantage
gained in destroying this important Iraqi command and control facility,
but whether the planners knew or should have known there were civil-
ians therein.
Nonetheless, proportionality, as traditionally understood, will retain
its utility in assessing reverberating effects, i.e., those effects not di-
rectly caused by the attack but rather by first tier effects. The most often
cited example is the attack on the Iraqi electrical grid during the Gulf
War.' 24 That attack severely degraded Iraqi command, control, and air
defenses; unfortunately, it also denied electricity to the civilian popula-
tion, affecting hospitals, refrigeration, emergency response capabilities,
and so forth. This type of problem will only be exacerbated in the next
century due to the interconnectivity of military and civilian functions.
For instance, an attack on a satellite providing weather data necessary
for flight operations may also deny weather data necessary for agricul-
ture and disaster relief operations. Destruction of a satellite providing
positioning data may likewise endanger civilian aircraft or ships by de-
nying them essential navigational information. Shutting down a
computer used to direct rail traffic in an effort to disrupt the military
logistic chain may cause shortages of essential civilian goods. The
spreading dependency on highly interconnected information and com-
munications systems contains within it particular risks of reverberating
effects during information warfare. These future realities will impel
proportionality calculations towards a macro view of collateral damage
and incidental injury."'
Military Necessity. The full spectrum dominance envisioned in
Bellum Americanum will surely stress, in an unintended way, traditional
124. For an excellent discussion of attacks on electrical grids, see James W. Crawford,
The Law of Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems,
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 1997, at 101. For criticism of the air campaign's
effect on the civilian population, see Roger Normand & Chris af Jochnick, The Legitimation
of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387, 399-402 (1994);
William M. Arkin, The Environmental Threat of Military Operations, in PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT 116 (Richard J. Grunawalt, et al. eds., 1996).
125. Paradoxically, reverberating effects may enhance the deterrent or compellant effect
of an action, for the greater the impact, the more likely a target state's decision-making will
be affected.
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understandings of military necessity. 26 Under current norms, an actor
must be able to articulate the imperative military advantage intended to
be gained by an attack. "There must be some reasonable connection
between the destruction of property [or individuals] and the overcoming
of the enemy forces.""' The problem is that as one side faces an oppo-
nent capable of militarily dominating across the diverse spectrum of
war, it will inevitably consider asymmetrical attacks, possibly using un-
conventional means.
The Iraqi Scud missile attacks against Israeli population centers
were portentously archetypal. In no way did the attacks contribute to
overcoming Iraq's enemies; Israel was not even involved in the conflict.
Yet the apparent randomness of the attacks disguised a very clever at-
tempt to fragment the Coalition by drawing the Israelis in and thereby
creating the specter of Arabs allied with Israelis in an attack on fellow
Arabs. Facing full spectrum dominance, Saddam Hussein sought other
means to weaken the forces facing him."'
History teaches that forces facing vastly superior opponents often
resort to seemingly random acts of violence. As incidents ranging from
the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem to that of the Khobar
Towers in Riyadh demonstrate, when frustrated on the battlefield disad-
vantaged opponents often carry the fight beyond the fields of fire in
order to rupture alliances, cause an enemy to lose the will to fight, or
weaken public or international support for their adversary's war effort.
If full spectrum dominance becomes a reality, acts that would seemingly
appear wanton or random, that is, not militarily necessary, will be more
readily characterized as all that is available to the disadvantaged side.
This may cause the concept of military necessity to slip over time in
much the same way that practicalities have caused a relaxation in the
criteria for combatant status.
Humanity. By contrast, Bellum Americanum exhibits stressors
which may suggest a heightening of the standards of humanity. Initially
expressed in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 as the use of means
that "uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their
death inevitable,"' the maturation of the principles of proportionality
126. On the subject of necessity generally, see H. McCoubrey, The Nature of the Mod-
ern Doctrine of Military Necessity, 30 REVUE DE DROIl MILITAIRE ET DE DROll DE LA
GUERRE 215 (1991); DE MULINEN, supra note 30, at 82-84.
127. Hostages (U.S. v. List), 11 T.W.C. 759, 1254 (1950).
128. For an argument that the Coalition violated the principle of necessity, see Nor-
mand & af Jochnick, supra note 124, at 402-09.
129. Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 2,
at 101. The principle is also expressed in Protocol I: "It is prohibited to employ weapons,
1083Summer 1998]
1084 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:1051
and humanity have subsumed much of its original meaning. After all, to
the extent the suffering is useless it is militarily unnecessary and, because
it offers no direct and concrete military advantage, disproportionate. Put-
ting this cumulative component of humanity aside, what remains are ab
initio prohibitions on methods and means of warfar& that are not so
much inhumane as inhuman. We intuitively recognize them as wrongful
regardless of the context in which they occur. To some extent, they are
acts which violate the "dictates of public conscience,' acts that civi-
lized people just don't do.
There has been a clear trend in the direction of prohibiting weapons
on the basis of humanity, most recently evidenced by the Chemical
Weapons,' 3' Biological Weapons,' Conventional Weapons,'33 and Anti-
Personnel Mines"' Conventions. There is little doubt that the employ-
ment of each of the prohibited weapons can, in specific scenarios, cause
minimal suffering and little risk to civilians or civilian objects. The use
of tear gas to protect a facility is more humane than the use of a rifle.
Similarly, Protocol IV of the Conventional Weapons Convention forbids
the use of permanently blinding lasers, thereby driving soldiers into the
projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering." Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 35 para. 2.
130. This phrase is drawn from the Martens Clause. Found in Hague IV, it provides:
Until a more complete code of laws has been issued, the high Contracting Parties
deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted
by them, the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule
of principles of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of pub-
lic conscience.
Hague Convention IV, supra note 112, preamble.
A similar provision is found in Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 1 para. 2.
131. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, U.N. Doc.
CD/CW/WP.400/Rev. 1, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
132. See Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 1.
133. See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 7, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980)[hereinafter Conventional
Weapons Convention].
134. See Conventional Weapons Convention, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), 19 I.L.M. 1529 (1980),
as amended on May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1209 (1996). In 1997 anti-personnel mines were
banned completely (for Parties) in the Ottawa Treaty on Personnel Mines. Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, available on-line at ICRC website, supra note 3. The Con-
vention is not yet in force.
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use of lethal force to protect themselves.' The rationale for these and
other cases is humanity. No matter how much it may make sense in a
particular context, civilized human beings do not blind or poison each
other, and therefore such behavior is outlawed.
Recall just some of the weapons imagined for the twenty-first cen-
tury-acoustic weapons that induce vomiting, microwaves that cause
the human body to heat up, and electromagnetic pulses that will cause
an airplane to fall to the earth because its engine shuts down. Such
weapons may be humane in certain circumstances, but there is little
doubt that many individuals will react to them viscerally as inhuman.
Given the current trend in humanity based conventions, we can expect
many of these weapons to be targeted for prohibition, regardless of their
military necessity or the possibilities they offer for proportionate use.
Treaty Regimes. War as envisioned in Bellum Americanum will
stress a number of treaty regimes. For instance, the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention prohibits the development, stockpile, acquisition,
or retention of "microbial or other biological agents, or toxins in quan-
tities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes" or of "weapons, equipment or means of delivery de-
signed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed
conflict."' By this standard the use of microbes capable of "eating"
rubber, silicon, electronics or oil is likely forbidden. Similarly, the 1972
Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits parties from developing, ac-
quiring, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons. Chemical weapons
include toxic chemicals which through their "chemical action on life
processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm
to humans or animals.' 37 Many supercaustics and metal embrittlement
agents could certainly fall into this category, and there is little doubt that
sleep-inducing agents would.
A particular challenge of Bellum Americanum is to the current legal
regime of space. There are a number of conventions which limit military
activities in space, the Outer Space Treaty being that with the widest
scope.' Article I of the treaty creates a res communis, res nullius area
135. See Protocol IV, supra note 1. Extensive discussion of the laser and mines issues
can be found at the ICRC's homepage website. <<http://www.icrc.orglunicc/icrcnews.nsf/
Doclndex/homeeng?OpenDocument>>.
136. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
137. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 131, art. 2.
138. On military activities in space, see Peter Jankowitsch, Legal Aspects of Military
Space Activities, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 143 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana
ed., 1992); Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Communications Satellites: A
New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and "Peaceful Purposes," 60 J. Am L. & COM. 237
(1994); Colleen Driscoll Sullivan, The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: An
Emerging Principle of International Law, 4 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 211 (1990).
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by providing that "[o]uter space ... shall be the province of all man-
kind... [and]... shall be free for exploration and use by all States."
Article III requires all activities in space be carried on "in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security" and restricts use of the
moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes.'"
These provisions would appear at odds with the conception of space
operations set forth in Joint Vision 2010, and by both the U.S. Space
Command and the U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. How, for
example, does the operational concept of space control, which includes
denial of the use of space to the enemy, comport with the Article I re-
quirement that it be preserved for use by all states? How can concepts of
force projection be squared with the reservation of space for peaceful
purposes? Indeed, how can the centrality of space to the U.S. vision of
warfare in the twenty-first century be at all consistent with the treaty
prohibitions?
In fact, the inconsistency it not as clear cut as might at first glance
appear. First, there is no prohibition on the placement of weapons in
space, only upon weapons of mass destruction. Thus whether or not
their use is prohibited, their development and emplacement would not
be. More fundamentally, whether or not the treaty would survive the
outbreak of hostilities is the subject of vigorous debate.
Under classic international law, treaties did not retain their effect
during armed conflict because war existed beyond the realm of interna-
tional relations-bellum omnium contra omnes. The more modern
approach accepts the survival of certain legal relationship between op-
posing belligerents.'" Three schools of thought characterize this camp.
The first maintains that whereas selected legal relations do survive,
treaties do not. A second group argues that treaties survive armed con-
flict unless their existence is fundamentally contrary to the existence of
conflict, as for example a collective defense treaty between two adversar-
ies would be. The third approach, labeled the "theory of differentiation"
takes a middle ground by asking whether continued vitality of the treaty
139. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploitation and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, arts. I &
3, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205,6 I.L.M. 386 (1967).
140. This was the position taken by Judge Benjamin Cardozo in Techt v. Hughes:
"international law to-day (sic) does not preserve treaties or annul them, regardless of the
effects produced. It deals with such problems pragmatically, preserving or annulling as the
necessities of war exact. It establishes standards, but it does not fetter itself with rules." 128
N.E. 185, 191 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920).
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in question is consistent with the larger context in which it operates
(such as the existence of Parties not involved in the conflict).4 ,
This area of law remains unsettled, particularly when applied in the
context of a multilateral treaty governing an entire media of the earth-
space environment. Nevertheless, the fervor of the debate can only be
exacerbated by Bellum Americanum's emphasis on space-based opera-
tions. As this occurs, calls to establish some degree of normative clarity
are certain to be heard.
Clarity will also surely be sought over the concept of the reservation
of space for peaceful purposes. There is a long-standing dispute over the
term, with some arguing that peaceful purposes should be understood to
be "nonmilitary," whereas others, including the United States, interpret
it as meaning "nonaggressive.' 4' Any military activities conducted un-
der U.N. Charter VII mandate, pursuant to the Article 51 right to
individual or collective self-defense, or consistent with the inherent
right of self-defense under customary international law would by defi-
nition be non-aggressive. As some states begin to enjoy full spectrum
dominance grounded in great part on space-based assets, whereas others
without the resources to exploit space are rendered vulnerable by their
relative nonparticipation in the space regime, the peaceful uses issue is
likely to resurface as a major substantive point of international discord.
Dissemination. In Bellum Americanum, the ability to direct lethal
force is increasingly pushed down the chain of command. Individual
soldiers, sailors or airmen of the twenty-first century will have far more
information on which to base the decision to employ force than their
twentieth century counterparts. Moreover, they will control a wider
spectrum of force capable of being applied with greater precision. Thus,
they will be both more and less lethal, and operate more autonomously
than ever before. This will drive up the need for relatively complex
training in the law of armed conflict at increasingly lower levels. Future
warfare will, therefore, move current law of armed conflict dissemina-
tion requirements towards reinforcement and strengthening, and
increase the importance of the role of legal advisers. 43
141. For a brief discussion of the approaches, see Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An
Assessment of the Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1
(1997).
142. See U.S. DEP'T. OF THE NAVY, supra note 107, at 2-38 n.114.
143. The requirement to train military personnel in the law of armed conflict is found in
many instruments. See, e.g., Hague Convention IV, supra note 112, art. 1; Geneva Conven-
tion I, supra note 92, art. 47; Geneva Convention II, supra note 92, art. 48; Geneva
Convention III, supra note 92, art. 127; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 92, art. 144; Pro-
tocol I, supra note 92, arts. 83 & 87; Protocol II, supra note 92, art. 19; Conventional
Weapons Convention, supra note 133, art. 6. On the role of legal advisers, see generally L.C.
GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 73-82 (1985).
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Normative Relativism. As the gap between the military "haves" and
"have nots" widens, there will be subtle stressors that encourage an in-
terpretation of the law of armed conflict relative to the state to which it
is applied. For instance, due to their high cost, not all states can afford
the precision munitions that help foster discrimination and proportion-
ality. State A, which cannot afford them, is not criticized when it drops
an unguided bomb that causes incidental injuries that are proportional to
the military advantage gained. However, when state B, which can afford
PGMs, elects to employ an unguided bomb in lieu of a precision
weapon, it must justify that decision as reasonable in the circumstances
(e.g., preserving PGMs for other targets which present a greater risk of
collateral damage and incidental injury). In abstracto, an identical stan-
dard is applied to both states-a requirement to minimize collateral
damage and incidental injury. In practice, however, the developed state
is held to a higher standard.
In the high-tech war of the twenty-first century this reality will be
exaggerated many-fold as the gap between "haves" and "have nots"
widens. If state A has limited sensor capabilities, whereas state B's are
robust, must state B reasonably exhaust those capabilities to ensure the
target is what B believes it to be or will it only be held to the standard of
care imposed on A? In all likelihood, the answer lies in the teleological
underpinnings of the law of armed conflict. It is no longer a body of law
designed to ensure a fair-fight between two opponents. On battlefields
of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the law of chivalry has been
overtaken by humanitarian law. Today, the law of armed conflict is de-
signed primarily to minimize suffering and prevent unnecessary
destruction. This being so, belligerents are held to the standards to
which they are capable of reasonably rising. The sole exceptions are
absolute prohibitions, such as the direct targeting of civilians or the use
of poison.
This normative relativism may take on a new form in the next cen-
tury. If the economic and technological gap widens as the alternative
future set forth above suggests, the move towards a capability-based
humanitarian regime may play itself out in an obligation to field weap-
ons that pose the least risk to protected persons and objects.'" Some
may even argue that if a wealthy state has the economic wherewithal to
arm its forces with precision weapons, it should be obligated to do so.
144. Since the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military has invested heavily in smart weap-
ons. For example, the two U.S. carriers deployed to the Persian Gulf during the February
1998 crisis carried with them more smart weapons than all six of the carriers deployed dur-
ing the war. See Bradley Graham, New Weapons Give Navy Top Air Role This imle, WASH.
POST, Feb. 12, 1998, at 1, 25.
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Similarly, it may be argued that if it has access to non-lethal weapons,
its forces must be armed with them so long as doing so is otherwise op-
erationally sound. This subtle shift from dictating tactics to dictating
public policy may well prove a by-product of the "haves-have nots" po-
larization of the twenty-first century.
The polarization may also determine the position states take towards
law of armed conflict codification efforts. For very logical reasons,
states likely to be the target of a particular mean or method of warfare
are most likely to support its prohibition; those likely to use it will gen-
erally oppose its banning. Thus, for example, the United States opposes
the Ottawa Treaty on Antipersonnel Mines in part because it sees great
utility for the weapon on the Korean Peninsula.4 1 Similarly, the United
States, which will remain the major space power into the next century,
interprets the Outer Space Treaty quite liberally. Given the technological
gap between militaries that will emerge in the twenty-first century, there
are certain to be attempts to offset weaknesses through bans on weap-
onry and its use. Support for such efforts, whether motivated by genuine
humanitarian concerns or a healthy dose of reality therapy about one's
own military impotence, will be determined in great part by the extent to
which a state enjoys the benefits of Bellum Americanum.
Of course, one must always be careful of what one wishes for. The
"haves-have nots" dichotomy is driven by warfighting concerns. In
terms of humanitarian principles, opposition to weaponry may not al-
ways be a positive stance. After all, much of the weaponry on the
drawing boards will effectively reduce collateral damage and incidental
injury to civilians and civilian objects. Those states which are neither
likely to use new weapons or be the target thereof will, therefore, play a
vital role as "honest-brokers" in maintaining the humanitarian raison
d'etre of the law.
CONCLUSION
Only time will tell whether the alternative future that has here been
labeled Bellum Americanum will be realized. To the extent that it is, law
can be expected to respond reactively and proactively to its changed
context. The normative consequences, some of which have been sug-
gested above, are clearly likely to be momentous. Assessments of
whether such changes are steps forward or backwards will often depend
145. U.S. policy on this issue is described in White House Office of the Press Secretary
Fact Sheet, U.S. Efforts to Address the Problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Sept. 17, 1997
(visited Sept. 13, 1998) <<http://www.state.gov/www/globallarms/index.html>>.
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,on one's perspective-nationality, ethical and humanitarian values, eco-
nomic station in life, etc. Nevertheless, regardless of the conclusions
individual cognitive contexts lead us to, there are portents of danger on
the horizon for humanitarian principles. The line between war and peace
and between inter and intra-state conflict may become dangerously
blurred. Discrimination is placed at risk by growing militarization of
civilians and civilian activities. The widening gap between military
"haves" and "have-nots" will encourage disadvantaged forces to fight
asymmetrically in ways that stress, possibly even violate, current nor-
mative parameters. The risk of warfare extending into a new arena-
space-is looming.
In light of these risks, and the fact that a revolution of military af-
fairs is upon us, perhaps the international community should take an
increasingly proactive approach to normative change. As new technolo-
gies in warfare are brought on-line, the disincentives for the "haves" to
abandon or limit them and the incentives for the "have-nots" to defeat
them through other than conventional means will be high. In a world
evolving as rapidly as today's, time is of the essence. Of course, this is
not to suggest codification for the sake of codification. Some weapons
and operational concepts foster humanitarian ends. The point is that the
time to think clearly about twenty-first century war and what can be
done to shape it is now.
In closing, it is worth noting that what is an objectively valid threat
to a normative architecture which fosters world order in the twenty-first
century is the seeming sterility of the acts future warriors will engage in.
The further removed they are from their act of wars, the more difficult it
will be for them to retain the humanitarian spirit which underlies the law
of armed conflict. It is one thing to push a button while flying through
the sky surrounded by nothing but clouds. It is quite another to watch a
human being you have shot bleed to death in front of you. The latter act
brings home much more vividly the moral significance of the authority
to use deadly force that you have been entrusted with. As we enter the
next millennium, we must guard against losing sight of the reality of
armed conflict, a reality found only in the consequence of an act, not the
act itself.
1090 (Vol. 19:1051
